



Theron Pummer on doing good without harming others 
Peter Singer famously argues that it is 
wrong of us not to give to effective char-
ities helping people in extreme poverty. 
In “Famine, Affluence, in Morality”, pub-
lished in 1972, he offers an elegant argu-
ment for this conclusion.  
The ethical premise of his argument is 
that, if we can prevent something very bad 
from happening, without thereby sacrific-
ing anything nearly as morally significant, 
then it would be wrong not to do so. In 
case this premise isn’t obvious enough on 
its own, Singer offers an example: suppose 
you’re walking past a shallow pond and you 
see a child drowning in it; you realise that 
the only way to save the child’s life is by 
rushing in quickly, ruining your clothes 
and shoes. Virtually everyone agrees that 
it would be wrong of you not to save the 
child. What seems relevant in this case is 
that you can prevent something very bad 
from happening (the child drowning) with-
out sacrificing anything nearly as morally 
significant (the loss of your clothes and 
shoes isn’t nearly as morally significant as 
the loss of this child’s life). Arguably, given 
that we think it’s wrong to let the child 
drown, we should also accept the ethical 
premise of Singer’s argument.
The empirical premise of his argument is 
that in fact we can prevent very bad things 
from happening, without thereby sacrific-
ing anything nearly as morally significant, 
by giving to effective charities helping 
people in extreme poverty. So, it is wrong 
of us not to give to such charities. 
One of the most impressive features of 
Singer’s argument is that it builds from 
premises that look plausible, independent-
ly of the broader ethical theory, if any, 
one accepts. Singer himself accepts conse-
quentialism, the ethical theory according 
to which an act is wrong if it fails to bring 
about the overall best outcome available 
to the agent. But many philosophers and 
non-philosophers alike instead accept 
non-consequentialism, and recognise the 
existence of moral options and moral 
constraints. Moral options entail that it is 
sometimes not wrong for an agent to do 
less than what would result in the over-
all best outcome. For example, even if it 
would make the world a better place if you 
gave up your kidney to stranger in need, 
intuitively it would not be wrong of you 
not to. Moral constraints entail that it is 
sometimes wrong for an agent to do what 
would result in the overall best outcome. 
For example, even if it would make the 
world a better place if you stole someone’s 
kidney and gave it to someone else in 
need, intuitively this would be wrong. It 
isn’t that non-consequentialists deny the 
moral importance of making the world a 
better place, or helping others; what they 
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deny is that this is the only thing that is 
fundamentally morally important. 
Given the entrenched disagreement be-
tween consequentialists and non-conse-
quentialists, an argument for giving to 
charity that takes consequentialism for 
granted would have limited appeal. But 
the ethical premise of Singer’s argument is 
compatible with consequentialism as well 
as non-consequentialism. The premise 
leaves unspecified what counts as “nearly 
as morally significant” as preventing a very 
bad thing from happening. Bringing about 
something else that’s very bad, or failing 
to bring about something that’s very good, 
could presumably be roughly as morally 
significant as preventing a very bad thing. 
But arguably doing something that’s sub-
stantially costly to you or to those near and 
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dear to you, or doing something against 
which there is plausibly a moral constraint 
(such as harming, killing, stealing, lying, 
promise-breaking, and so on) can also be 
roughly as morally significant as prevent-
ing a very bad thing. The ethical premise 
would not imply that it would be wrong 
to refuse to give until you’re poor yourself, 
as – from the perspective that you have the 
moral option not to do what results in the 
best outcome – that is arguably as morally 
significant as preventing much greater bad 
things. The ethical premise would also not 
imply that you have a moral obligation to 
steal from the rich and give the money to 
charity, as – from the perspective that you 
are under a moral constraint not to steal 
even if this results in the best outcome – 
that is arguably as morally significant as 
preventing much greater bad things. Sing-
er intentionally leaves it quite unspecified 
what counts as “nearly as morally signifi-
cant” in order to give his argument wide 
appeal. On any serious, minimally reason-
able way of filling in “nearly as morally 
significant”, the ethical premise will appeal 
to consequentialists and non-consequen-
tialists alike as well as work together with 
the empirical premise to deliver Singer’s 
famous conclusion. 
One might fail to be convinced of Singer’s 
argument on empirical grounds. In partic-
ular, one might doubt that in fact we can 
prevent very bad things from happening by 
giving to effective charities helping peo-
ple in extreme poverty. One might doubt 
whether there are any such effective char-
ities.
The causal processes by which your money 
does things for those in extreme poverty 
are, I am afraid, far more complex than 
most charities let on. Worse still, taking 
the bad effects of charities together with 
the good ones, it is for very many charities 
extremely unclear whether your donations 
are likely to prevent more bad than they 
produce. While experts on government aid 
for international development have been 
around for decades, until fairly recently 
one would have been hard-pressed to find 
anyone who might reasonably qualify as 
an expert on individual giving: someone 
who has carefully and systematically em-
pirically studied the net impact per dollar 
that everyday individual donors can have 
by giving to various charities. Of course, 
we’ve long been exposed to the claims of 
impact embedded in advertisements from 
the charities themselves, but, to put it 
gently, these aren’t always the most unbi-
ased sources of information. Many of us 
have come across websites (like Charity 
Navigator) that impartially rank charities 
according to what proportion of their do-
nations they spend on administrative costs 
rather than their actual programs. But in 
the absence of information about the like-
ly effectiveness of these programs, such 
websites are pretty pointless as a guide to 
individual giving. 
Fortunately, for almost ten years now, two 
independent, transparent, rigorous, and 
reputable charity evaluators have come on 
the scene. These are GiveWell and Giving 
What We Can. After reviewing thousands 
of different charities, these organisations 
together recommend only about half a 
dozen. It is worth noting that both organi-
sations have ranked Against Malaria Foun-
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dation (which distributes insecticide-treat-
ed bednets) and Schistosomiasis Control 
Initiative (which distributes deworming 
tablets) in their highest categories. In light 
of the convergence among the experts on 
individual giving, I believe that the every-
day individual donor can be reasonably 
confident that donations to these and 
similar charities are very likely to prevent 
much more bad than they produce. In-
deed, impressed with the amount of good 
individuals can do with relatively small 
contributions, and with the enormous dif-
ferences in cost-effectiveness between dif-
ferent charities, many now subscribe to the 
philanthropic philosophy and social move-
ment known as effective altruism. 
There is excellent evidence of the exis-
tence of effective charities helping people 
in extreme poverty, which supports Sing-
er’s empirical premise. However, one might 
doubt the empirical premise in another 
way: one might doubt that in fact we can 
prevent very bad things from happening, 
without thereby sacrificing anything near-
ly as morally significant, by giving to ef-
fective charities helping people in extreme 
poverty. In particular, one might worry 
that in giving to charity, unlike rescuing 
the child from the shallow pond, you sig-
nificantly risk harming individual people. 
In his 2010 essay “Poverty is No Pond”, 
Leif Wenar writes: 
“From the perspective of an individual liv-
ing in poverty, a particular aid effort may 
harm more than it helps. The aid may 
strengthen the autocrats, corrupt bureau-
crats, warlords, soldiers or criminals that 
have power over that person. A humani-
tarian effort may draw the person away 
from their self-sustaining livelihood; a 
development project may draw them into 
acquiring skills for which there is no em-
ployment. Aid in aggregate may increase 
inflation, reduce employment, or weaken 
the provision of public services. Aid flow-
ing into this person’s country may delay 
needed political reforms, and make both 
the government and the citizens more re-
sponsive to foreigners than to each other. 
Aid may inflame economic inequalities 
or ethnic antagonisms in ways that are 
bad for this person, or damage his or her 
self-esteem. And so on. Even assuming an 
aid project or official aid to a country helps 
overall, it may leave at least some people 
worse off than before.”
Wenar spells out each of these risks in de-
tail in his essay, which I highly recommend 
reading. In the case of the drowning child, 
you can allow harm to befall an individual, 
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We can prevent very bad things 
from happening, without sacrificing 
anything nearly as morally significant 
leaving the child as badly off as she’d be 
if you did nothing. In the case of giving 
to charity, on the other hand, not only 
can you allow harm to occur, but you can 
also impose harms on individuals, making 
these particular individuals worse off than 
they’d be if you did nothing. The latter 
is of special moral concern to non-conse-
quentialists. While it’s wrong to fail to save 
a drowning child, intuitively it is morally 
worse to grab a child off her tricycle and 
drown her (even assuming the outcome is 
the same either way).
Consequentialists believe it is morally per-
missible to impose risks of harm on indi-
viduals, provided that it’s part of what’s 
likely to be best overall. Many non-con-
sequentialists do not. It is not generally 
morally acceptable, on their view, to im-
pose harms on some people, even if oth-
er people benefit enough such that things 
are better overall. Benefits to some do not 
straightforwardly morally cancel out the 
harms imposed on separate persons (e.g., 
it is not the case that drowning one child 
and rescuing another is morally equivalent 
to doing neither). One might object that 
Singer’s argument fails to be convincing to 
non-consequentialists, despite his efforts. 
In particular, one might claim that, as long 
as the notion of “nearly as morally signif-
icant” leaves room for moral constraints 
against risking harm to individuals, the 
empirical premise will fail to obtain (how-
ever plausible the ethical premise is).
I believe this is a mistake, and that such 
concerns about risks of harming individu-
als should not deter non-consequentialists 
from embracing Singer’s conclusion. The 
short version is that in some realistic cas-
es of giving to charity, it is not wrong to 
impose these risks; typically they are not 
aimed at in order to achieve further ends 
but instead are generated as side effects of 
interventions that are likely to do a lot of 
good overall, and often they are distribut-
ed across people in a way that is morally 
acceptable.
In their important new book Responding to 
Global Poverty, Christian Barry and Gerhard 
Øverland claim that it can be morally ac-
ceptable to impose a risk of harm on some-
one if doing so is part of providing that 
same person with a chance of benefit, such 
that, taking into account the likelihood of 
the harm as well as the benefit, things are 
on balance likely to be better for this per-
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It is for very many charities unclear 
whether your donations are 
likely to prevent more bad 
than they produce
son. Call such balancing intrapersonal risk 
balancing. On the other hand, consider 
imposing a risk of harm on someone as part 
of providing someone else with a chance of 
benefit, even if things are on balance like-
ly to be better overall. Call such balancing 
interpersonal risk balancing. According 
to many non-consequentialists, this lat-
ter type of risk balancing is, other things 
being equal, more morally objectionable 
than intrapersonal risk balancing. To get a 
more concrete handle on these two types 
of risk balancing, let’s have a look at a pair 
of imaginary cases.
The first is called Risks to the Ill: One hun-
dred people are dying of a terrible illness. 
If left alone, they’d each have only a 20% 
chance of survival. However, they can take 
drug X, which would increase their chanc-
es of survival to 80% each. The only way 
to get drug X to them is by putting it in 
the water supply, and, we can suppose, 
there are no other people nearby to drink 
this water. However, drug X has a negative 
side effect. It risks liver damage, imposing 
a 10% chance of death on each of the one 
hundred ill people who take it (absent this 
risk taking drug X would increase their 
chances of survival to 90% each). 
Now let’s consider a second case, called 
Risks to the Healthy: One hundred peo-
ple are dying of a terrible illness. If left 
alone, they’d each have only a 20% chance 
of survival. However, they can take drug 
Y, which would increase their chances of 
survival to 90% each. The only way to get 
drug Y to them is by putting it in the wa-
ter supply, which, we can suppose, would 
mean one hundred healthy people would 
also receive drug Y. And, while drug Y has 
no negative side effects when ingested by 
people with the illness, it risks liver damage 
when ingested by healthy people, imposing 
a 10% chance of death on each of them. 
Risks to the Ill is an example of intraper-
sonal risk balancing, whereas Risks to the 
Healthy is an example of interpersonal risk 
balancing. Other things being equal, intra-
personal risk balancing seems morally ac-
ceptable given that each person is likely to 
be better off on balance. Interpersonal risk 
balancing seems more morally problemat-
ic, even if it is likely to be best overall. It’s 
not that non-consequentialists must be 
absolutists about this, claiming that it is al-
ways wrong to engage in interpersonal risk 
balancing, no matter how small the risks to 
others are and no matter how good things 
will likely be overall. That would be implau-
sibly extreme, and it would imply that vir-
tually all of our actions are wrong. No mat-
ter what you do, there is always some risk 
that through some butterfly effect an indi-
vidual elsewhere will be harmed. Instead, 
what the non-consequentialist should say 
is that interpersonal risk balancing can be 
morally justified, but that to the extent 
that the risks to others are large, and to the 
extent that the harms they might incur are 
large, the imposition of such risks would 
have to make things likely to go propor-
tionally much better overall, to be morally 
justified. And perhaps when the risks and 
associated harms are large enough, some 
non-consequentialists would be attracted 
to a kind of absolutist view, claiming that 
such interpersonal balancing is wrong, no 




The imaginary cases described are unreal-
istic in the following respect: Risks to the 
Healthy is a purely interpersonal risk bal-
ancing case, and Risks to the Ill is a purely 
intrapersonal risk balancing case. In the 
real world, often cases will be mixed, being 
more or less like one of the pure cases. 
There is a further complication. In intra-
personal risk balancing cases like Risks to 
the Ill, each of those who would receive 
the risks of harm alongside the chances of 
benefit is on balance likely to be better off. 
But suppose that, on reflection, these ill 
people prefer not to have the intervention 
simultaneously bringing risk of harm and 
chance of benefit. Then it may seem that 
nonetheless imposing the intervention on 
them would be disrespectful and morally 
problematic. But what if only one out of 
the one hundred in Risks to the Ill prefers 
not to have the intervention, while the 
other ninety-nine very much do prefer it? 
Again, a non-consequentialist need not be 
an absolutist about this, claiming that it’s 
wrong to engage in intrapersonal risk bal-
ancing whenever anyone involved prefers 
not to have the intervention, no matter 
how many others prefer it and no matter 
how good things will likely be overall. That 
would be implausibly extreme, and it would 
imply that virtually all policy decisions are 
wrong. For any policy decision, it is likely 
that at least one person affected by it will 
prefer not to be so affected. Instead, what 
the non-consequentialist should say is that 
intrapersonal risk balancing can be morally 
justified even when it is not preferred by 
some of those affected, if enough others 
affected do prefer it and if it makes things 
likely to go sufficiently better overall.
What all this suggests is that, when our 
charitable giving would impose risks of 
harm on particular individuals, there are 
a number of things we need to know to 
determine whether it would be wrong to 
proceed. First, we need to know how good 
overall each of our acts is likely to be. Ac-
cording to consequentialists, this is all we 
need to know. But according to non-con-
sequentialists who believe there are mor-
al constraints on imposing risks of harm 
on individuals, we need to know more. 
To what extent would we be engaged in 
intrapersonal rather than interpersonal 
risk balancing? (Again, realistic cases will 
often involve a mixture of the two types 
of risk balancing.) How serious are these 
risks to individuals, in terms of degree of 
likelihood and degree of harm? To what 
extent do those affected by our act prefer 
the package of risks of harms and chances 
of benefits it delivers to them?
I believe that several effective charities 
do quite well in terms of these non-con-
sequentialist criteria, in addition to the 
consequentialist one. You can assess this 
for yourself. Visit the GiveWell website 
(givewell.org) and the Giving What We 
Can website (givingwhatwecan.org). Look 
up their top charities, particularly Against 
Malaria Foundation (AMF) and Schistoso-
miasis Control Initiative (SCI). Read their 
detailed reports and follow links to other 
documents where appropriate, etc. In ad-
dition to studying the positive effects of 
these charities, be sure to have a look at 
GiveWell’s analysis on “possible negative 
or offsetting impact” (e.g., they discuss the 
risk that distributing bednets in certain 
areas will lead to overfishing, if they are 
misused). Consider this empirical data on 
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AMF and SCI from GiveWell and Giving 
What We Can against the backdrop of the 
general risks of giving to overseas charities, 
discussed by Wenar. Seek out and listen to 
the views of experienced people who have 
worked in development overseas.
Giving to AMF or SCI is certainly not risk-
free, but in my view it involves relatively 
little risk of doing serious harm. Moreover, 
it is important to keep track of which par-
ticular people these risks of harm accrue 
to. To the extent that the risks of harm are 
imposed strictly on those immediately af-
fected by AMF, for example, there may be 
no non-consequentialist objection here at 
all. This is because the likely benefits to 
those immediately affected by AMF’s oper-
ations are large enough that it’d be plausi-
ble to classify this as a purely intrapersonal 
risk balancing case. But going back over 
Wenar’s list of risks of harm, one might 
observe that these risks pertain to people 
well beyond those immediately affected 
by the given charity’s operations. Indeed, 
nearly everyone within the country or 
broader geographic region of the charity’s 
operations is potentially exposed to these 
sorts of risks. And it is harder to morally 
justify imposing such risks on people who 
do not at the same time enjoy chances of 
benefiting. 
One of the particularly brilliant things
about charities like AMF and SCI, howev-
er, is that they bring with them significant 
chances of benefits to these wider groups, 
too. GiveWell and Giving What We Can 
cite research suggesting that fighting malar-
ia and neglected tropical diseases are likely 
to have positive economic effects, which 
extend to everyone within the country or 
broader geographic region of these inter-
ventions. This fact makes giving to AMF 
or SCI more like a case of intrapersonal 
risk balancing, and so more morally ac-
ceptable. To the extent that these chances 
of benefits to each of those in the wider 
region outweigh the risks of harms to each 
of those in this wider region, we’d again 
have a case of purely intrapersonal risk 
balancing, which is morally acceptable. A 
consequentialist might view such chances 
of wider benefits as merely another factor 
increasing the likelihood of making things 
better overall. But to a non-consequential-
ist concerned about the morality of impos-
ing risk of harm on particular individuals, 
they can serve to partially or fully remove 
what otherwise would have been a moral 
obstacle to giving. All things considered, 
my view is that AMF and SCI do well in 
terms of the non-consequentialist criteria 
outlined above, and that we can prevent 
very bad things from happening, without 
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Concerns about risks of harming 
individuals should not deter one 
from embracing Singer’s conclusion
thereby sacrificing anything nearly as mor-
ally significant, by giving to them. 
Not everyone will, upon studying the em-
pirical data, come to the same conclusion I 
have. But even if we should not give to any 
overseas charities, on grounds of risk of 
harm, does this mean that Singer’s conclu-
sion is false? Not exactly, as we could save 
up and grow our money rather than give it 
away now; we could instead give at a later 
time when presumably the risks of giving to 
charities are better understood. Of course, 
this carries with it the risk that we will nev-
er actually give! Another option is to give 
to promote charity research (for example 
by giving to GiveWell’s Open Philanthropy 
Project), so that our donations can be used 
to accelerate progress on understanding 
the likely benefits and harms of giving to 
charities helping those in extreme pover-
ty. This form of giving carries virtually no 
risk of harming others, and it is likely to do 
considerable good in the long run. This is 
another way of preventing very bad things 
from happening, without thereby sacrific-
ing anything nearly as morally significant.
Theron Pummer is a lecturer in philosophy and 
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70
Forum: Effective Altruism
Esther McManus
